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ABSTRACT
Gestures are a topic of increasing interest in authentication
and successful implementation as a security layer requires
reliable gesture recognition. So far much work focuses on
new ways to recognize gestures, leaving discussion on the
viability of recognition in an authentication scheme to the
background.
It is unclear how recognition should be deployed for prac-
tical and robust real-world authentication. In this article, we
analyze the effectiveness of different approaches to recogniz-
ing gestures and the potential for use in secure gesture-based
authentication systems.
1. INTRODUCTION
Authentication has become an essential component in daily
life. Increasingly, it is the gateway to critical facets of the
human experience such as work, communication, and en-
tertainment. To be effective, any authentication technique
must be: reliable, difficult to compromise, and, above all,
easy to use when the user is focused on the activity behind
the gateway and not the authentication itself.
Gesture-based methods have advantages over current pop-
ular authentication methods (e.g. text entry, PINs, biomet-
rics) given that gestures can be performed faster while also
being highly customizable [11], easier to remember [6], and
potentially more secure [11]. Gestures require lower concen-
tration and accuracy as compared to other methods, and
thus, have potentially lower chances of error when used by
stressed or distracted people. For example, an incorrectly
entered text-based password yields an automatic rejection
whereas some inaccuracy or deviation of the gesture pass-
word can still lead to a positive identification.
It is important to note the difference between a recognizer
and an authentication system. The recognizer is one aspect
of an authentication system, which can consist of several
components (such as the user interface). To the best of our
knowledge, there are no comprehensive surveys available of
different recognition methods for gestures. Even more im-
portantly, there is no critical discussion available on how
these proposals should be compared to each other or how
to use them to design robust and highly usable authentica-
tion systems. Prior studies have looked at basic issues such
as asking participants to generate “secure and memorable”
gesture passwords with no other instructions [11]. Gesture
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authentication is at the stage where this work needs to be
supplemented by a deeper understanding of usability and
effectiveness. This is not possible until a large open dataset
is created that will allow direct comparison of different ges-
ture recognizing methods. Until such a dataset is available,
we can qualitatively analyze different approaches to gesture
security. Towards this end, our work contributes as follows:
1) survey of common gesture recognizers, 2) design consid-
erations for gesture-based authentication systems, 3) sug-
gestions for comparing recognizers, 4) evaluation of gesture-
based authentication compared to text-based passwords.
2. GESTURE TYPES
There is no universally accepted terminology for gesture
types. Often, different names are used for the same type of
gesture. From a top-level view, gestures are divisible into
two categories: touchscreen gestures and motion gestures.
Illustrations of these can be seen in Figure 1. These two
gesture classes can also be free-form (created without con-
straints and cues) or pre-defined by the creator of a recog-
nizer.
2.1 Touchscreen
Touchscreen gestures are defined as those that are cap-
tured through a touchscreen.
• Single-stroke gestures use only one finger of the hand
to perform a continuous input on the screen
• Multistroke gestures are discontinuous gestures that
allow for multiple stroke attempts at the screen before
completion.
• Multitouch gestures use more than one finger to per-
form a continuous gesture.
2.2 Motion Gestures
Motion gestures are performed in three dimensions and
can be divided into sensor-based and camera-based gestures.
Sensor-based gestures use other sensors than a camera or
touchscreen (e.g. accelerometer on a smartphone). This di-
vision is motivated by the challenges the input techniques
represent for recognizers as well as the abundance of prior
work. Camera-based methods represent the majority of pub-
lications in gesture recognition, warranting its own category.
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3. THREAT MODELS: ATTACKS AGAINST
GESTURES
Authentication systems need to be resilient against at-
tacks. To successfully attack a gesture, an attacker must be
capable of replicating the features accurately enough to fool
the recognition algorithms into accepting the gesture as au-
thentic. There are at least four ways a gesture password can
be compromised: shoulder surfing, brute force, dictionary
attacks, and storage leakage.
3.1 Shoulder Surfing
Shoulder surfing is where an attacker tries to memorize a
password or secret via line-of-sight. Some ways to shoulder
surf include:
1. Standard: The attacker observes the user from a van-
tage point that allows easy viewing of the user’s ges-
ture.
2. Recording: The attacker can observe the user’s gesture
from a recording.
3. Multiple attackers: Attackers can work together from
multiple vantage points to focus on specific parts of a
password at different times and reconstruct it later.
3.2 Brute Force
Brute force attacking is done by repeatedly trying pass-
words to find the right one. This can be a way to measure
the susceptibility of a recognizer to algorithmic attack. An
equivalent attack on text-based passwords would be trying
to guess the password without having an access to the hashes
of the passwords (see: Storage Leakage).
3.3 Dictionary Attack
A dictionary attack is similar to a brute force attack ex-
cept that the password attempts come from a set of more
likely possibilities (such as datasets from user studies). Dic-
tionary attacks have been demonstrated against gestures.
A robot was built to perform gesture inputs on a smart-
phone based on training data from human participants [10].
The robot was capable of successfully authenticating for at
least half of the gestures in the sample population. How-
ever, this approach relied on a simplified assumption that
the touchscreen device would not lock itself after numerous
unsuccessful attempts.
3.4 Storage Leakage
Storage leakage can be a problem depending on how the
gesture password is stored on the device. To successfully
steal a gesture based on stored data, a thief would have
to know both the structure of the recognizer and how to
translate the stored values into gesture actions. Text-based
passwords mitigate storage leakage by only storing the cryp-
tographic hash of the password. Storage leakage is a serious
issue for gesture passwords given that no two inputs will be
exactly alike, which makes comparing their hashes difficult.
4. COMPARING AUTHENTICATION SYS-
TEMS
Before discussing recognition in full, it is useful to outline
aspects of gestures as an authentication scheme to moti-
vate their viability as a replacement for (or supplement to)
text-based passwords. The best way to do that is to eval-
uate gestures on three criteria: usability, deployability, and
security. These three metrics follow from an exhaustive sur-
vey of authentication methods [3], which unfortunately does
not discuss gestures. Usability addresses the viability of a
scheme from the perspective of the user. Deployability ex-
amines what infrastructure a method requires in order to be
usable. Security refers to the ability of a system to resist
attacks.
All known alternative systems do not have the full range of
features offered by text-based passwords [3] and gestures are
no exception to this. Intentionally or not, decades of infras-
tructure and development has gone into making text-based
passwords ubiquitous. Because of this, and in spite of the
many disadvantages of text-based passwords, it is difficult
for any scheme to match all the benefits they have. Advanc-
ing the development of alternative schemes could allow for
a real challenger to text-based passwords.
4.1 Usability
Gestures are potentially more memorable than text-based
passwords because human recall is better for pictorial con-
cepts rather than strings of text [6], although there is no
definitive measure of the memorability of a password. It
cannot be yet stated whether complicated gesture passwords
are more memorable than complicated text-based ones, but
there is evidence from human psychology [6] and user stud-
ies [11] to support the assertion.
Gesture-based passwords are as easy to adopt as text-
based passwords. Most people have used gestures as a way
to communicate silently or even drawn pictures to explain
something to another person. Little additional training is
required to teach people how to use them. The introduction
of the Android 3x3 grid-based graphical password can be
thought of as a primer to using gesture-based passwords on
touchscreen devices.
Latency and error rates are natural usability related con-
cerns, and can reduced with proper recognizer design. Error
rates are harder to minimize. Complicated gesture pass-
words could have better rates than complicated text-based
passwords.
Password recovery or the ability to reset your password
is necessary for usability. Gestures are equal to text-based
passwords in this – the same systems in place that exist
to recover text-based passwords can be applied to gesture
passwords (see Deployability). The password recovery flow
for gestures will be different than with text-based passwords
since the features of a gesture can be used to recover their
password. A simple example would be asking a user to trace
a set of characters and seeing how that correlates to their
past behavior. Proper users can either be shown a picture
of their gesture or given steps or hints as to how it can be
replicated.
The effort required to authenticate depends on the pop-
ulation under consideration. Given the ubiquity of text-
based passwords, user effort can be higher when starting out
with gestures since the users are primed to more comfortably
use keyboards. On the other hand, Android users could be
primed by the 3x3 graphical password system towards touch-
screen gestures. However, differently-abled users (e.g. para-
plegics) who cannot naturally interact with a smartphone,
touchscreen, or properly motion to a camera are at a disad-
vantage.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
(f)
Figure 1: An illustration of the different types of gestures. (a) through (d) are different types of touchscreen
gestures while (e) and (f) are motion gestures. (a) is a single stroke gesture, (b) is a multitouch gesture, (c)
is a multistroke gesture, and (d) is a combination of multistroke and multitouch gestures (the hatch pattern
can be drawn by using two fingers and doing two strokes: one stroke with two fingers to get the horizontal
portion and a second stroke to form the vertical portion). (e) is an example of a sensor-based motion gesture
by rotating a smartphone. (f) is a person being recorded for a camera-based motion gesture.
4.2 Deployability
Gesture passwords, with current technology, cannot be
used by all the people who can use text-based passwords.
The differently-abled can face issues using gestures, espe-
cially if they suffer from a loss of sight or motor function.
Users do not require additional tools to authenticate. This
does not mean that gestures are compatible with all current
systems – rather that they integrate well into existing in-
frastructures. Although touchscreen tablets and phones are
already prominent, laptops and monitors with touch capa-
bility are starting to become more commonplace as well.
Alternatively, gestures could be generated with a mouse or
using the touch-interactive mousepads on laptops. A nega-
tive is that, for motion gestures, desktop users may require
a separate webcam component.
Gestures are not server compatible – this is attributable to
both their infancy as an authentication scheme and the pro-
liferation of text-based passwords. Some devices use biomet-
rics as a master password, allowing integration with servers.
A gesture could be used as a master password in much the
same way. This would improve server compatibility, but it is
not a perfect solution – the problem stems from the inability
to reliably compare the hash of two different gesture inputs.
Gestures can be integrated into web browsers. HTML5 or
mobile websites can have a gesture capture area for touch-
screen and allowing a browser access to the camera would
enable camera-based gestures. A mobile platform could ob-
serve a motion gesture on behalf of the browser. Using ges-
tures may require additional hardware on desktops (e.g. we-
bcam, external sensors), though these are becoming default
equipment for desktops, too.
4.3 Security
Gestures can be more resistant to shoulder surfing attacks
than text-based passwords, depending on the amount of fea-
tures used in recognition. Replication of the exact way a
gesture is performed can be more difficult than assembling
all the characters of a text-based password, however, this de-
pends on the password length. Similar to biometric systems,
personal knowledge does not yield clues that could reveal a
user’s gesture password. Comparing the security of text-
based passwords to gesture passwords is an open problem.
It is possible to quantify the security of a gesture password
based on a “surprisingness” factor [11]. This score allows for
password creation policies similar to text-based passwords
(e.g. rejecting “simple” passwords and instructing the user
to try again).
If a system restricts the number of failed attempts, then
it becomes difficult to compromise the password. As with
text-based passwords, gesture passwords can be stolen if
the attempts are not limited and if the attacker is properly
trained [10]. The lower accuracy needed for gestures, an
advantage in usability, is a disadvantage here. This demon-
strates the need for proper gesture password creation policies
such as the ones used for text-based passwords.
Storage leakage is a problem because of the fact that there
is not yet a way to store gestures such that two similar inputs
would have the same cryptographic hash. One way could
be to train a recognizer to quantize the data within very
small intervals. The intervals should be chosen so that users
could reliably perform inside them. Quantized data can be
appended to a string and then hashed. The downside is
that this approach could have large error rates and would
require more precision when performing the password than
what would normally be required.
5. DESIGNING RECOGNIZERS FOR AU-
THENTICATION
Some design considerations can be learned from prior work
on recognizers [15], although the focus there was on recog-
nition and not authentication. Additionally, some of the
aspects for reliable recognition [15] do not translate to reli-
able authentication (e.g. location and scale invariance). We
extend the previous work with design considerations for au-
thentication systems.
1. Sample invariance. Different devices have different
sampling rates. Additionally, there are natural vari-
ances in the speed and time with which a user per-
forms gestures between authentication attempts. A
recognizer should resample the input to obtain an ac-
curate portrait of the gesture while keeping the number
of samples constant.
2. Trainable. A good recognizer allows for the design
and learning to handle new inputs. It should not use
only predefined gestures. It should also differentiate
between similar gestures (e.g. drawing a rectangle ver-
sus a square). Users need to be allowed to create their
own gestures to maximize usability and comfort while
leveraging the full utility of the password space.
3. Adaptive. User behavior can change over time. For
example, users will learn to perform their gesture pass-
word with higher speeds. The recognizer should adapt
to these changes over time. It should work through
stored templates and features long after the initial
training phase to figure out which templates are work-
ing and which ones are not.
4. Computationally efficient. When designing efficient
recognizers, it is necessary to minimize the overall com-
putation, memory, and delay introduced by the algo-
rithm. The overall user experience is degraded if there
is a noticeable pause with every login attempt.
5. Storage conscious. Recognizers should not make the
system unusable by storing a large number of tem-
plates or extracted features. The gestures should also
be protected from theft by straightforward copying.
6. Configurable. A gesture recognizer should allow op-
tions for users and developers. Examples include con-
trol over the sampling rate or how many stored tem-
plates to use. Users could also configure security set-
tings based on personal needs.
7. Attack resistant. A recognizer must be efficient at re-
jecting false users. Gestures are represented as a col-
lection of features. These features form layers that
increase resistance to attacks. With more features, a
recognizer increases its ability to exclude impostors.
Examples of these features are: pressure, speed, finger
or arm length, body type, and path length. Recogniz-
ers with more than one layer can be considered attack
resistant.
8. API-friendly. Although recognizers can be described
in papers and with pseudocode, it may not be enough
to be understandable to developers. A difficult, non-
intuitive recognizer can have adoption issues. Devel-
opers that benefit from it (e.g. college students or star-
tups) would have trouble using the recognizer if it is
too difficult to implement.
6. SURVEY OF COMMON APPROACHES
TO GESTURE RECOGNITION
A gesture recognizer uses algorithms to interpret human
gestures.
Designers have been creating new recognizers for either a
neglected gesture type or for supporting new features. This
has led to numerous innovations in recognition for different
gesture types. However, from a security engineering per-
spective, there is not enough consideration put towards au-
thentication. Below, we analyze several popular algorithms
and in Table 1 we summarize how these algorithms correlate
to the design principles of the previous section.
6.1 Geometric Methods
This family of recognizers performs distance-based com-
parisons on stored templates of coordinate pairs. For touch-
screen gestures, the comparative measure is coordinate pairs
in the plane. For motion gestures, the measure is either ac-
celerometer or gyroscope data side of a volume [4]. The
following discussion applies to several recognizers including
$1 [15], $N [1] and Protractor [5] for touchscreens. Protrac-
tor3D [4] is an extension for motion gestures. All of these
recognizers perform at least these first four out of five steps:
1. The gesture is resampled to N points.
2. The resampled gesture is translated to the origin.
3. The size is normalized so the points are contained
within a bounded cube.
4. It is then rotated until the angle that the first point
in the sequence makes with the centroid of the gesture
sequence is zero.
5. The gesture is then iteratively rotated until an align-
ment is found that produces the optimal score with a
given template.
A motion gesture recognizer does not need to consider
rotation, and therefore the fifth step above does not apply
to it. The concern is with the difference between successive
accelerometer and gyroscope readings.
Geometric recognizers are sample-invariant and can be
trained to identify new gestures. They are partially adapt-
able since they could store every single successful attempt as
a new template at the expense of both storage and efficient
computation, although this renders early templates mean-
ingless. The algorithms are computationally efficient since
templates are stored in a pre-processed form, requiring only
the new attempt to be processed. Since they store little more
than geometric features, but do not protect the data, they
are partially storage conscious. They are configurable since
a user can be granted control over every step in the algo-
rithm. Geometric recognizers are partially attack resistant
since they only have one layer of features to breach. Finally,
they are API-friendly since they perform simple operations
on coordinate pairs.
6.2 Dynamic Time Warping
Successive inputs tend to be mismatched because it is dif-
ficult for users to enter their gestures the exact same way
every time. For example, a user might have rounded a cor-
ner more sharply in one attempt or the other input is drawn
more slowly and carefully. From a top-level view, these at-
tempts will often appear identical. Where they differ is in
the details – one will have more sampling points than the
other. The distribution of the inputs, when plotted against
time, will often be very similar to each other – the differ-
ence being that they may appear as time shifted versions of
each other. Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) transforms the
gestures such that they can be compared directly.
DTW fixes this misalignment by stretching the gestures
such that they are aligned perfectly in time – the way this
is done is by repeating sampling points in areas where one
input is shorter than the other. So an NxM matrix of path
differences between gestures is constructed and traversed in
a way that resamples each gesture to an equal length. Af-
ter that, point-wise distance comparisons can be made and
measured against a threshold to determine authentication [9,
12].
DTW is sample invariant due to the alignment of time se-
ries. Distance based measures are used to do recognition on
stored templates after alignment, allowing for trainability.
It is partially adaptable, using the same logic applied with
the geometric methods above. It is partially configurable,
since the only aspect the user can control is the authenti-
cation threshold and the template count. Common DTW
implementation is computationally inefficient, but there ex-
ist implementations that can reduce the computation time.
However, that results in tradeoffs in recognition efficiency,
leading to it being classified as partially computationally ef-
ficient. DTW is partially storage conscious, requiring no
extra data than a small number of templates but it makes
no provisions on protecting the data. It is partially attack
resistant given that it is based on one layer of resistance (co-
ordinate pairs). It is partially API-friendly, because it is not
straightforward to implement path alignment and to reduce
the complexity beyond the general implementation.
6.3 Machine Learning Techniques
Machine learning studies algorithms to teach computer
how to perform tasks from data. This is a natural fit for
performing gesture recognition. The most popular methods
are Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) and Support Vector
Machines (SVMs).
6.3.1 Hidden Markov Models
For HMM recognizers, the user’s input appears as a col-
lection of features (e.g. time, pressure, distance) and not as
a known gesture. The sequence of states (the Markov pro-
cess) a gesture undergoes (e.g. up, left) cannot be seen, only
the measurable outcomes (it lasted for t time and has N
samples).
An HMM consists of a set of states, a transition proba-
bility matrix describing the chance to transition from one
state to another, and an output probability function. Each
individual gesture to be recognized for a system requires its
own, pre-specified HMM. Given the input data, the recog-
nition task is to figure out a sequence of state transitions
a user’s gesture might be mapped to. There is more than
one possible state sequence for any input. The most likely
sequence (and thus gesture) is determined by evaluating the
joint probability of the sequence and observations [8].
6.3.2 Support Vector Machines
SVMs are a set of supervised learning algorithms that
can be used for classification and recognition problems [13].
SVMs solve a binary classification problem. In the context
of gestures, the two classes would be a specific gesture (Class
1) and “not a gesture” (Class 2). A collection of gestures can
be split into one of these classes depending on what is being
recognized. If plotted in a plane, there should be a visual
way of drawing a boundary such that Class 1 and Class
2 data points are separated from each other. The Class 1
and Class 2 data points that are closest to each other (and
thus closest to the boundary) are called the support vectors.
These are the most difficult data points to classify since they
most closely affect the location and contour of the boundary.
SVMs are useful because support a large number of vari-
ables, representing them as vectors of features. However,
the data will need to be mapped to a higher dimensional
space proportional to the number of features. In order to
create a decision boundary, a non-linear equation must be
solved. The training data is used to construct the boundary
and new user input is classified as a gesture depending on
what side of the boundary it ends up on.
Both HMM and SVM do not depend on the number of
samples; more is often better. Both can be trained to accept
any input. Since learning is a continuous process, both can
be made to adapt over long periods to user input. Computa-
tionally, they are the slowest algorithms presented and are
partially computationally efficient because of this. HMMs
require a large number of training examples due to the many
different paths a gesture can take, requiring more space.
SVMs can function properly with a low number of examples,
depending on the basis set and complexity of the recogni-
tion space. Neither HMMs nor SVMs store training data in
a way that protects it from leakage. As such, HMMs are not
storage conscious and SVMs are only partially conscious.
HMMs and SVMs have more layers of resistance to attacks
since they are capable of using many different features (not
just coordinate and time data) to recognize gestures. They
are, however, difficult to program and are not API-friendly.
6.4 Other Gesture Recognition Methods
A gesture could be identified by measuring very small,
finite Doppler shifts between incoming and outgoing WiFi
signals [7]. If a user is wearing an RFID tag, an array of
antennas can be used to track the disturbance caused by
a gesture [2]. A tag moving between the antennas gener-
ates readings which are fed back wirelessly and analyzed to
determine what gesture is being performed. Similarly, there
are demonstrated methods for hand gesture recognition with
capacitive proximity sensors. A person waving their hand
would generate readings of different magnitudes at different
timestamps, from which the gesture can be determined [14].
These methods are not sample invariant – their recogni-
tion method is based on discovering patterns in data, which
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Table 1: A summary of the design considerations as applied to the described recognizers. See each section
for justification on the rating system.
Legend:
3= Has the feature∼= Has aspects of the feature, but not fully realized
7= Does not offer the feature
sampling to a constant can affect. All three have some de-
gree of trainability since they are capable of learning some
gestures. However, there can be resolution issues between
recognizing two similar gestures with these methods that is
difficult to resolve. There are no provisions for adaptivity.
While capacitive and RFID recognition are computationally
feasible, WiFi recognition has involved steps due to vari-
ous transforms needed to analyze the input data so it is not
computationally feasible. All three are neither configurable
nor resistant; they have difficulty distinguishing users and
focus only on gestures. Finally, only WiFi and RFID are
partially API-friendly since common equipment are avail-
able (e.g. routers, tags), proximity sensors require special
equipment and programming.
7. CROSS RECOGNIZER COMPARISONS
It is useful to understand how different recognizers reliably
compare to each other. Typical measures of performance
used for recognition are: Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curves and Equivalent Error Rates (EERs).
An ROC curve is a plot of a user’s successful login rate
to a system versus an attacker’s successful login rate as the
threshold to authenticate is varied from zero (accept any
input as the password) to infinity (reject any input, even
the real password). As the threshold increases, the rate of
false positives (FPR) decreases and the rate of true posi-
tives (TPR) increases (up until a certain point, at which
it then decreases). Varying this threshold generates a new
(TPR,FPR) point at every step – the plot of these together
forms the ROC curve. The EER is the rate at which the
number of accepted attackers and rejected true users are
equal. Perfect recognizers would have a TPR of 100% (all
true user attempts accepted), an FPR of 0% (all attacker
attempts rejected), and an EER of 0% (0% rejected true
users and 0% accepted attackers).
Ideally, the recognizer with the lowest reported EER value
would be the best one to use. But that intuition fails since
recognizers are rarely, if ever, computed across same datasets;
most designers generate new datasets to evaluate their sys-
tem. In an authentication system, just recognizing a gesture
is not enough, we need to know whose gesture it is.
Many recognizers focus on differentiating a narrow vocab-
ulary of gestures (e.g. a circle from a rectangle) and report
results based on that.
For authentication, it is necessary to compute EER values
based on attacks against a gesture. Most recognizer design-
ers do not do this. To justify the validity of recognition
techniques, there needs to be a common reference point to
compare the EERs.
A large and public dataset of gestures that are meant for
testing recognizers is a necessary step for comprehensive rec-
ognizer comparison. This is not a unique problem. Optical
Character Recognition (OCR) algorithms faced the exact
problem that gesture recognizers face now. There was no
way to adequately compare all of the different methods un-
til the U.S. Department of Energy commissioned the large
scale creation of a comprehensive OCR dataset that devel-
opers could use to test their algorithms. A similar situation
was present in speech recognition problems as well. The
unifying theme here is that recognition algorithms are not
directly comparable without an extensive public dataset.
Many recognition algorithms are dependent on the input
data type, complicating the process of creating a dataset.
However, there can be issues if not enough features are gath-
ered from a gesture. As an example, a dataset compiled
around motion gestures on a smartphone may collect time,
coordinate, accelerometer, and gyroscope data. But there
could be a new recognizer that might need data from the
gravity or magnetometer sensors. The dataset should be left
entirely open so new features can be added when needed.
The sets used for benchmarking should be categorized
based on specific test criteria. Example sets include: weak
passwords, strong passwords, memorable passwords, and mem-
orable and strong passwords. The gesture type is also an
important variable.
Since there is no public dataset yet, comparing the rec-
ognizers for authentication purposes, requires answering the
following questions:
1. What is the dataset that the recognizers are being com-
pared to?
2. How do these recognizers compare to one another based
on the design criteria (Table 1)?
3. Were the EER values computed for the algorithm sub-
ject to gesture-based attacks?
4. How do error rates vary as features are added or sub-
tracted?
8. CONCLUSIONS
We divided gestures into two categories: touchscreen and
motion-based gestures. The attacks against gestures include
common methods to attack passwords such as brute force,
dictionary attacks, and storage leakage. We used the usabil-
ity, deployability, and security framework [3] to highlight
areas where gestures are not as good as text-based pass-
words. Specifically: they are not usable by members of the
differently-abled population, they do not yet integrate seam-
lessly into Internet architectures (making them more suit-
able for personal devices and offline security solutions), and
that they are susceptible to storage leakage with no reliable
way to compare hashes of two attempts.
We discussed design considerations for gesture recogniz-
ers: sample invariance, trainability, adaptivity, computa-
tional efficiency, storage consciousness, configurability, at-
tack resistance, and API-friendliness. Of the most common
gesture recognition algorithms, none appear to offer all fea-
tures simultaneously. SVMs currently satisfy most of the
considerations. Many recognizers that exist are not inher-
ently designed to authenticate, but rather to recognize dis-
tinct gestures.
The presented algorithms are not directly comparable on
the basis of EER since none of them are computed using
the same data. Gesture recognition requires a large pub-
lic dataset to allow comparison, similar to optical character
recognition and speech recognition.
Finally, gesture-based authentication systems show poten-
tial for practical adoption. Although they have disadvan-
tages, these can be attributed to the lack of development in
recognizers and infrastructure. Text-based passwords work
well for users that are comfortable with physical keyboards,
yet touchscreen keyboards are becoming more and more
common with the proliferation of mobile devices. Eventu-
ally, touchscreen keyboards may replace physical keyboards
altogether. On those interfaces, gestures become a more
natural authentication choice than a text-based password
because it is more difficult to type character strings. How-
ever, the ubiquity of text-based passwords makes it exceed-
ingly difficult for alternative methods to gain traction. The
potential benefits of gestures should not be ignored because
of the current limitations.
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